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Al~tract--The insights we have acquired about symmetries during the past 25 years have not only 
contributed to the construction of successful explanatory schemata in elementary particle physics, they 
have also modified the conceptual framework within which a series of philosophical nd methodological 
issues of elementary physics are discussed. 
The atomistic paradigm of high energy physics cannot any more be dismissed because the proposed 
elementary particles are too many (and, hence, it is claimed, they do not provide a simple account of 
nature) or because it is not possible to observe quarks in an isolated manner. The developments in particle 
physics have brought about radical changes to our notions of simplicity and observability, and in this 
paper we elaborate on these changes. It is as a result of these changes that the present situation in 
elementary particle physics justify us to claim that we have indeed reached a level of explanation where 
the constituent particles (quarks, leptons, gluons and intermediate bosons) used for the explanation of 
the various phenomena considered to be delineating a particular level in the descriptive framework of the 
physical phenomena and a specific stratum in the organization of nature, can be regarded as elementary. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Does the present situation in elementary particle physics justify us to claim that we have reached 
a level of explanation where the constituent particles used for the explanation of the various 
phenomena can be regarded as elementary? 
I will argue in what follows that we are presently in a position to systematically investigate this 
question and also provide an answer, in the affirmative, not because of any new experimental 
discoveries where the elementary particles have been observed, but only because of the insight 
we have acquired about symmetries during the past 25 years and which has brought about radical 
changes to the concepts of observability and simplicity which necessarily dominate any discussion 
about the philosophical and methodological spects of elementary particle physics. The role of 
symmetries in constructing theories to account for the phenomena associated with particle physics 
has been analytically presented in the volume preceding the present one and will not be repeated 
here [1]. Nor will there be any examination of the series of problems arising out of the relationship 
of the notion of elementarity with much of our (Western) metaphysical tradition [2]. The implica- 
tions of the problematique concerning "teleological" and "first cause" arguments to the concept of 
elementarity will interest us only indirectly, and we shall concentrate, not on the ontological status 
of the various entities considered to be elementary, but rather on the methodological role of these 
entities in the construction of theories. 
What is, however, an elementary particle? What are the aims of elementary particle physics? 
An appropriate place to look for an answer, is the two thorough and detailed reports of the National 
Research Council (U.S.) since, if anything, they reflect a view compatible with the consensus of the 
high energy physics community. 
"We call a piece of matter an elementary particle when it has no other kinds of particles inside of it and 
no subparts that can be identified--we think of it as a point particle." [3] 
And as for the subject itself it is stated that: 
"The nature and purposes of elementary particle physics concern both the discovery of new phenomena 
exhibited by matter (and other forms of energy) under extreme conditions and the understanding of known 
phenomena." [4] 
It is, then, quite remarkable that given these "definitions", the survey of the literature on the 
whole [5], displays a truly paradoxical situation. Despite the fact that the accounts of the various 
developments conform absolutely with the definition of what an elementary particle is, nearly all 
the writers express reservations and doubts about whether the particles we would presently consider 
as elementary [leptons, quarks and intermediaries (the photon, the Ws, the Z, the gluons)] should 
really be given the status of the ultimate constituents of matter. 
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Two reasons are usually projected to justify nearly all the reservations expressed about the 
elementary character of all the structureless particles we know today and especially of the quarks. 
It is, firstly, remarked that not all of them have been seen and that all attempts to find free quarks 
have failed. And, secondly, that there are too many of those particles to consider them as the 
ultimate building blocks. In other words, despite the fact that leptons, quarks and intermediaries 
would be absolutely compatible with the "accepted efinition" of what an elementary particle is, 
further methodological criteria such as those of observability and simplicity are invoked in order to 
doubt the elementary status of the very same particles. 
The common conclusion, then, of most people who pass judgement on the present status of high 
energy physics, can be summarized as follows: granted that quarks, leptons and intermediaries are 
particles with no other kind of particles inside them, and they are in that respect point particles, 
we can neither observe in an isolated manner all of them, nor are they so few as to make up a 
convincing simple schema. Based, in effect, on this syllogism Schrader-Frechette [6] argues that the 
Kuhnian paradigm of the world being built up by elementary particles hould be abandoned, and 
that atomism is in deep crisis. This particular claim has been convincingly rebutted by Cushing [7]. 
It may be argued that using explicitly stated methodological criteria for a further appraisal of 
physical theories is something to be encouraged. One still wonders, however, about he status and 
the degree of concensus reached for the criteria with respect to which various questions are to be 
appraised. Do the criteria for particles to be regarded as elementary express a consensus only good 
for the day-to-day activities of physicists? Yet when an overview of the developments is attempted 
there seems to be a shift to a new consensus this time about he non-elementarity of the very same 
entities which are regarded as elementary in the day-to-day activities! 
2. SUCCESSFUL METHODS, BROKEN SYMMETRIES AND 
THE QUESTION OF SIMPLICITY 
It is undoubtedly the case that reading the developments of high energy physics is necessarily 
influenced by one's metaphysical views, ontological beliefs and epistemological preferences. It 
should not however escape our attention, that more often than not, it is the impressive success of 
the methods employed to understand the phenomena and the ensuing confidence inthe theory which 
becomes dominant in the evaluation of the developments rather than more sophisticated philo- 
sophical considerations. Therefore, a considerable amount of confusion can be dispelled, if, in such 
evaluations, the following are differentiated and kept separate: 
1. The metaphysical beliefs and the ontological claims. 
2. The successful methods. 
3. The emerging picture of nature. 
It is then a different question altogether, if as a result of our studies, we would decide to modify 
(1) because of (3) or choose to elevate (2) to a principle which seems to be the best for contributing 
to philosophical rgumentation a d so on. Let us take an extreme, yet especially characteristic case. 
The investigation of the problem of elementarity motivated by the success of S-matrix theory, and 
an analogous investigation motivated by the success of quantum field theory, will necessarily oblige 
the adoption of two different ontologies. In the case of the former, for example, the elementarity 
of particles i to be searched "in a reality" similar to that which emerged from the study of molecules 
and atoms and where complexity is expressed in terms of "excited states". The continuous sub- 
division of matter as a means of finding the elementary particles will be doubled since the question, 
"what does a particle consist of?", is meaningless for such an approach if the energies used to find 
the constituents are larger than the mass of the particle being searched into. Thus, the specification 
of elementarity becomes, in effect, synonymous to achieving a self-consistent derivation of any 
given particle by "everything else" [8]. The study of the same problem, motivated by the success 
of quantum field theory leads to quite a different situation. Here, the belief that it is possible to have 
a detailed space-time description of particles under extreme relativistic conditions by their fields is 
paramount. The "reality" where the elementary particles are to be sought is very similar to that 
which emerged from the study of electromagnetism with its "well-defined" procedures oftranslating 
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the "tangible" particles into fields. In these examples, one can then see how the success of a 
particular method, under the influence of the "emerging reality" forces the adoption of a particular 
ontology [9]. 
It is interesting to note that Heisenberg's insistence to develop a way of viewing "elementarity" 
by extending arguments primarily used in atomic spectroscopy leads to the proposal that "what we 
have to look for are not fundamental particles, but fundamental symmetries" [10]. Such a proposal, 
however, does not provide us with an alternative framework to answer the questions we posed in 
the beginning. What is being sought is not the kinds of possible ontologies within which one could 
accommodate a notion of elementarity and be able to "read" consistently the various theories of 
particle physics. The opposite, in fact, is the case: the questions we posed presuppose a particular 
ontology--that of "the ultimate building blocks". What is sought is the contextual (and historical) 
character of "the ultimate". 
We would like to argue that some of the problems mentioned above can be partly dispelled and 
a satisfactory answer be given to the questions we posed, (1) if elementarity is examined within a 
framework where the particles are to be regarded as elementary to the extent hat they can be used 
to achieve a unified account of all phenomena, nd (2) if it is realized that the development of 
elementary particle physics has brought about conceptual changes which have radically modified 
the admittedly controversial issues of observability and simplicity, and that, if anything, a case can 
be made that the criterion of observability cannot be identified with observing an entity in an 
isolated manner, nor that of simplicity with "fewness". 
The emphasis on relating the study of the problem of elementarity o the question of seeking a 
set of laws providing a unified description of nature is not merely an attempt to take into account 
what has been the outstanding aim (and success) of high energy physics during the past years. What 
has been neglected, however, in the various discussions about elementary particles is an appraisal 
of the methodological status of the concept of elementarity within a context created by the attempts 
to construct a theory which provides a unified account of what seem to be different interactions 
giving rise to a class of phenomena. Finding (and I would say deciding) that a set of particles are 
elementary is meaningful only to the extent hat it can be shown that these particles are sufficient 
for a unified account of as many phenomena which--intuitively, atleast--we consider as delineating 
a particular level in the descriptive framework of the physical phenomena and a specific stratum 
in the organization of nature [11]. Each such level has a relatively autonomous status. It is this 
relative autonomy which is important here, since there is always something with respect o which 
autonomy is signified, and that no level is fully autonomous since some of the phenomena used to 
delineate ach level do not unambiguously belong to a single level. Furthermore, it is the relative 
autonomy which allows reductionism from one level to the next, and yet the relative autonomy of 
each level is what confines the practice of constructionism to within each level. 
Instead of, then, asking the question, what are the ultimate constituents of matter?, one should 
rather inquire about those (ultimate) constituents ofmatter which can be used to provide a unified 
description of phenomena and be, in turn, determined by this description. It is the latter that is 
historically meaningful, even though it was the first question that acquired a legitimacy on purely 
epistemological grounds. The (theoretical or experimental) search for the ultimate constituents of 
matter is then related with ways of "combining" them, proposing schemata by which we can build 
up the composite particles and the phenomena to which they give rise to, and understanding in a 
more fundamental manner those laws and regularities which have already provided an explanation 
for many phenomena and whose validity has been repeatedly tested. It is within such a framework 
that the status of the various constituents so far as elementarity is concerned, has to be appraised. 
Simplicity as a criterion to be used for choosing among "competing" modes of explanation has 
been repeatedly invoked by physicists and philosophers alike, and it was usually the "more 
symmetric" mode that was eventually preferred. Its discussion is inherently difficult, especially if the 
aim is to reach a consensus on how the criterion of simplicity should be used in a consistent manner. 
Its only meaningful discussion seems to me is to argue about the relative merits of a particular 
criterion with respect o other such proposed criteria. The notion of the "ultimate constituents" of
matter and the ways devised to reach a consensus about their identity has been inextricably related 
to the notion of simplicity. And it is within such a problematique that among the many modes whose 
explanatory power is roughly equivalent, he one with the fewer proposed (sub)particles if favored 
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as having a chance of being "more fundamental". It is such a viewpoint which associates simplicity 
with fewness that is used to reject the quark model as providing a self-consistent account of 
phenomena in terms of elementary particles, because there are too many constituents which are 
particular to the quark model to be given the status of elementary. 
Even though the adoption of such a particular criterion of simplicity cannot be comprehensively 
defended, there are some questions which can be posed independent of any specific criterion of 
simplicity. What happens, for example, if a particular criterion of simplicity appears to be violated 
in a systematic manner? How justified is one in using any such criterion, if one knows beforehand 
that it is bound to be violated? Can one talk of degrees of simplicity? Or, is there any meaning to 
the notion of approximate simplicity? 
We will not attempt o answer these questions, but note that the developments in high energy 
physics seem to provide us the conceptual framework that allows their examination. Take, for 
example, the use of symmetries. It is no exaggeration to claim that symmetries have been regarded 
by physicists not only as principles of universal validity, but also as indications of the simplicity of 
nature at its deepest level. However, most symmetries are demanded from the theories, with the 
certainty that they are violated either by interactions which have not been taken into consideration 
or dynamically. Various techniques have been devised to calculate the contributions of these 
violations. In the unified theories of particle physics, the approximate character of the symmetries 
of the strong, electromagnetic and weak interactions, i  possible to be explained as being a consequence 
of gauge invariance and renormalization. There are, really, only exact symmetries which govern all 
interactions and their approximate character is dynamically explainable [12]. These new insights we 
have gained into the structure of theories allow us to inaugurate a totally different approach to the 
question of simplicity, rather than being entangled in the deadlock brought about by the process 
of deciding how many is too many, or how few is not too many! 
3. THE NOTION OF OBSERVABILITY 
The developments in high energy physics, however, imply the possibility of a radical departure 
from a notion of observability so closely tied with the observation of entities in an isolated manner. 
Details of the quark model, on which some of the contents of this section are based, can be found 
in Lipkin [13] and Greenberg and Nelson [14]. 
The development ofhadron physics has, until recently, consisted of a series of ad hoc rules, models 
and assumptions which were, at best, loosely connected to one another and even more tenuously 
related to an underlying dynamical theory. In the more recent past, however, one theory of hadrons 
has begun to emerge as something of a standard theory. This is the Yang-Mills theory of colored 
quark and gauge fields. Quantum chromodynamics (QCD) is a quantum field theory of the strong 
interactions with non-abelian gauge fields mediating the interactions between the quarks. The 
outstanding challenge posed by this theory is to learn to make reliable computations of hadron 
properties in a systematic fashion. Nothing comparable to the Feynman rules and the perturbation 
approximation series in quantum electrodynamics (QEC) exist for the bound state physics of 
the QCD. And there is no proof for the existence of a single bound state in any relativistic 
four-dimensional quantum field theory. 
These difficulties notwithstanding, QCD has certain attractive features. It does not seem to be 
in conflict with any existing phenomenology of the strong interactions, and the symmetries that 
can be extracted from QCD are precisely the symmetries of the strong interactions and no more. 
Local gauge invariance of the color SU(3) and the formal existence of quarks transforming as the 
fundamental representation f this group are the only requirements and they seem to be sufficient 
to specify the theory. 
Even though QCD has been constructed in close analogy with QED, the intermediaries of the 
strong force or the color charge quark, the gluons, have non-zero interactions (and self-interactions) 
among themselves. Exactly because gluons carry the strong color charge, it is possible for the color 
charge of a quark to be shared with the gluon cloud in addition to a color polarization phenomenon 
much like the charge screening of QED. Because the color charge is spread out rather than localized, 
the effective color charge will tend to appear larger at long distances and smaller at short distances. 
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The outcome of the competition between these two opposing tendencies depends on the number of 
gluon species that can share the color charge and on the number of quark types that can screen the 
color charge. If the color gauge group is SU(3), the net effect is one of antiscreening, that is, of a 
smaller effective charge at short distances. Extremely close to the quark, the effective color charge 
becomes vanishingly small, so that nearby quarks behave as if they are non-interacting free particles. 
This is the origin of the term asymptotic freedom. 
Interestingly, asymptotic freedom does provide a partial, at least, justification of the parton model 
put forth to describe violent scattering processes: the measurable quantities are reproduced by 
assuming that the constituents of a proton are a swarm of non-interacting point entities. 
Asymptotic freedom offers a qualitative explanation tothe paradox of quasi-free quarks that are 
permanently confined. At the short distances probed in deep inelastic scattering, the effective color 
charge is weak, so the strong interactions between quarks can largely be neglected. As quarks are 
separated the effective color charge grows, so the strong interaction becomes more formidable. This 
is the property of confinement [15]. What confinement means in QCD is that all physical states are 
color SU(3) singlets. Confinement implies that the color degrees of freedom are in principle not 
observable in an isolated manner although they mediate the strong force. The quarks and gluons 
since they are not color singlets have no corresponding physical states. 
The prediction of a new particle (and usually its discovery) isfollowed by a process of"elementar- 
izing" it. There is firstly the assignment ofquantum numbers (mass, charge, spin, strangeness etc.) 
and its assignment to one of the particle families (leptons, quarks, intermediaries). Particles are, 
thus, first labelled and classified. The process, however, of "elementarization" is not completed 
unless the procedures of observability are also specified. One of the reasons that quarks are not 
regarded as elementary is because these procedures of observability are taken to imply observing 
an entity in an isolated manner. This is, however, totally unwarranted since the procedures of 
observability can be specified in such a manner so as to dispel any reservations about he possibility 
of not recognizing in a unique manner what it is that is being observed. In case a newly discovered 
particle is not observed in an isolated manner, it can be claimed that fulfilling the following 
conditions pecifies the particle uniquely: 
(a) Account for already observed particles. 
(b) Account for already observed interactions/decays. 
(c) Account for already observed properties (e.g. magnetic moment). 
(d) Account for any observed unexpected phenomenon. 
(e) Predict particles/events and absence of events. 
(f) Predict events unique to particular mode because of constraints involved. 
This process of "elementarizing" a particle is just another way of utilizing the polymorphous role 
of the symmetry considerations in elementary particle physics. 
These are procedures that do not allow for the possibility of either manipulating or intervening 
[16]. If, however, the impossibility to manipulate and intervene isstipulated by the theory itself, one 
is by no means justified in demanding that the only way a theory would be acceptable is if it responds 
positively to what then amounts to an externally brought-in criterion. If isolating a single quark is 
to be considered as the ultimate convincing evidence for the reality of the quarks and for accepting 
them as constituting elementary entities, is that not a way of negating, at least, the methodological 
implications of confinement which seems to be a dynamical property of gauge theories? Alternatively, 
the totality of the proposed steps that make up the procedures of observation seem to be consistent 
with these implications. A parallelism can be made with the quantum theory of atoms. So far as 
quantum theory is concerned it is meaningless to pose the question as to where an electron is after 
it "leaves" an outer orbit and before it "appears" at a lower one. If one wants to make a claim about 
the discreteness ofspace-time, this meaninglessness cannot be taken as an indication for any claim 
favoring the discreteness of space-time. And it is "doubly wrong", after taking the interpretation f 
the electron jump as giving indications of discreteness in the structure of space-time, tothen criticize 
the theory because it uses continuous pace--time parameters. The same circular argumentation 
seems to me is being used in the case of the quarks, when it is demanded, on the one hand, that 
they be freely observed, when, on the other hand, their role has been articulated through a theory 
where confinement is a property derived from those structural characteristics (gauge invariance and 
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renormalization) which are at least a necessary (and for some a sufficient as well) condition for 
achieving a unified description of all interactions. 
Let us consider some characteristic cases from the history of elementary particle physics which 
have forced us to rethink the whole question of observability. 
At first sight, the law of energy conservation (and of linear and angular momentum) did not seem 
to hold in the weak-decay with an initial state composed of only a neutron and a final one composed 
of the two observable particles, the proton and the electron [17]. This situation prompted some 
physicists to question the validity of the law of conservation of energy when applied to individual 
microscopic processes. W. Pauli's suggestion first in 1930 and then in 1933 appeared at the time 
equally, if not more, preposterous. He proposed that a massless particle with zero charge and 1/2 
spin and which because of its feeble interactions with surrounding matter escapes observation, is 
the carrier of the missing energy. This was something extremely bothersome since it was not like 
the other "unseen" particle, the photon, which could be accounted for as the quantum of the 
electromagnetic field by the then newly developed techniques of the second quantization. And, 
especially,, after the demonstration f the particle-like behavior of the photon, the latter's tatus 
among the elementary particle s of the period was hardly doubted. That was not, however, the case 
with the neutrino when it was first proposed. The change came after the proposal of a successful 
theory of weak interactions by E. Fermi in 1933-34, in analogy with QED. The subsequent 
corroborating evidence in favor of such a theory left no doubt about he "existence" ofthe neutrino 
long before its first observation i an isolated form in 1953. 
The second example is somewhat more intriguing. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle allows for 
the law of energy conservation tobe "violated" provided this violation occurs in processes whose 
duration and the extent of the violation are related by Planck's constant. One of the simplest 
implications of such a state of affairs is for an electron to emit a photon and in a little while to absorb 
the same photon. Since the details of the electron-photon interaction were among the best known 
quantities, the effects of this phenomenon should have been quite straightforward to calculate. The 
calculation was, indeed, quite straightforward, its results, however, turned out to be infinite: the 
charge of the electron, as a result of such an effect had to be modified by an infinite amount. This 
difficulty was resolved in the late forties by the work of S. Tomonaga, J. Schwinger, R. Feynman 
and F. Dyson, where the mathematical techniques used were followed by a new intepretation of
the physical meaning of the parameters expressing mass and charge. The terms which were infinite 
expressed the various interactions ofthe "bare mass" rn0 and "bare charge" e0, and which eventually 
gave the electron mass and charge their measured values, m 0 and e0 would be the values of the 
electron mass and charge if all interactions were to be turned off--something impossible anyway 
and also devoid of any physical meaning and practical use. The way out of this difficulty was to 
put the physical mass and charge m0 and e0 plus the correction terms, whenever in the expressions 
there appeared the m and e. One now had two sources of infinities which "cancelled" each other: 
the one coming from the calculations of the various quantities when m and e are substituted by 
m0 and e0, and the other by the corrections [18]. 
The third example is related to the possibility provided by the "coloring" of the quarks to 
construct a fairly satisfactory schema for the strong interactions [19]. 
QCD, constructed in analogy with QED, and after a considerable amount of insight was gained 
about he gauge theories, possesses the quite remarkable property of asymptotic freedom. The closer 
the quarks are to each other inside the hadrons, the weaker the interaction among them is and 
they behave like "free" particles. If the potential between the quarks is of the form g(r)/r, then 
asymptotic freedom follows from the structure of the theory. Because of quantum corrections the 
effective coupling constant of a quantum field theory depends on the distance scale r at which the 
coupling constant ismeasured. Thus, since ~(r) tends to zero as r tends to zero it is, then, possible 
to use perturbation theory for small r. It should be strongly emphasized that the corresponding 
quantum mechanical effect in electromagnetism is vaccum polarization and what amounts to 
asymptotic freedom is achieved in large distances--a state of affairs which has influenced the 
formation of our "traditionally" held view about observing isolated entities. The confinement of
quarks whose only proofs available are model dependent, seems to be quite indispensable for the 
only promising way of incorporating gravity into a unified description of all forces. 
Elementary particle physics 463 
Recent developments introduce a different kind of "confinement" as well. The future success of 
the superstring theories is quite strongly dependent on devising a convincing method to show that 
the ten dimensions which are necessary to construct the theory can, in fact, be "compactified" to the 
four that make our space-time continuum [20]. The rest are there, but unobservable, all curled up, 
not having had a chance to unfold during the first instants of the big bang--allowing, in a variant 
of the inflationary universe, for the "existence" of (many) universes with different dimensionality 
[211. 
The examples we mentioned isplay a move from (1) a situation where the unseen is accounted 
by a new theory and the procedures for its observation in an isolated form are explicitly and 
unambiguously stated, to (2) a situation where the proposed theory shows how to tame the 
catastrophes brought about by the unseen, proposing at the time procedures for observing 
manifestations of the unseen, to (3) a situation where remaining unseen is guaranteed by the theory 
itself modifying analogously the procedures of observation. 
It may be remarked that there is no rigorous proof of confinement which is (relatively) model 
independent, and that such a situation cannot justify our placing so much emphasis on this concept. 
Such an argument, however, is quite irrelevant for what we attempt o do in this paper which is to 
answer the two questions we posed at the beginning. And one of the ways for providing an answer 
is to show that the developments in high energy physics eem to be establishing a framework which 
legitimizes the use of a set of concepts which should, at least, motivate us to question our beliefs 
about the observability of the ultimate building blocks. This is, obviously, not a claim for the 
correctness of the dominant heories in particle physics, but rather an appeal to realize that on a 
conceptual level, we are in a position to have theories, which allow for quite radical departures from 
a set of accepted procedures of observability. 
Might not all these be a series of mathematical tricks to ensure that what is not observed stays 
unobserved, because basically it is not there to start with? After all, there is such a historical 
precedent. It is the ether, whose ever enriching "physical" attributes were postulated "as excuses 
for hiding evidence of it from experiment" [22]. The parallelism, however, cannot be sustained for 
one very crucial difference between the two. We now know that the main reason ether was 
introduced, was because of the prevailing prejudices in favor of the mechanistic outlook. It was 
impossible to imagine and accept he propagation of waves independent of a medium. One of the 
truly remarkable aspects of Einstein's 1905 paper, is that it shows that the ether was not a necessary 
notion for a consistent reading of both electromagnetism and mechanics [23]. His arguments 
convinced us that showing that something is unnecessary may have as tangible and measurable 
results as proving that something is right or wrong. For the case of ether every time there was a 
failure to observe an expected property, there was an enrichment of its physical attributes. The 
situation with the quark model is totally different. Every predicted property of the quark model has 
been corroborated, and further efinements were able to account for the observed eviations. In the 
case of the ether the additional physical attributes guaranteed that what was "expected" and looked 
for and not found, stays unseen. In the case of the quarks what was expected was found and the 
development of the theory gave rise to confinement. In the case of the ether, one had from the start 
an unsuccessful mode of explanation, whereas in the ease of the quarks one had, right from the 
beginning, a successful model. 
4. CONCLUSION 
What I have attempted to do was to argue that appraising the developments in high energy 
physics within a context founded on an ontology of "a few, freely observable ultimate building 
blocks" as being the elementary particles is quite misleading, and does not really conform with the 
implications of the emerging conceptual framework of these recent developments. The insight we 
seem to have been gaining for the features of the "subnuclear level" is that a consistent and unified 
account of all phenomena of this realm can be satisfactorily built with quite a few particles taking 
part in gauge invariant and renormalizable interactions which necessarily confine some of the 
constituents. It is only in this sense that leptons, quarks and intermediaries can be regarded as 
elementary, and that the paradigm of elementary particle physics is in no crisis. 
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Does all this mean that there is no possibility for a further underlying structure to be discovered? 
Does this mean that leptons, quarks and the intermediaries will forever remain structureless, 
however much we try to find their structure? Nothing justifies any denial to such developments and 
if past experience is to have any guiding value new structures will almost certainly appear. One of 
my aims was to show that reaching the "smallest" and "structureless" constituents may in fact be 
a necessary condition in order to consider them as elementary, but it is by no means a sufficient 
condition. This latter requirement can only be fulfilled if these structureless constituents can actually 
provide a unified explanation of all the phenomena characteristic of a particular "realm", thus 
bringing forth the methodological significance of "elementarity" during each historical period. 
Concerning the developments of the last 25 years, nowhere is this significance more pronounced 
than in the changes brought to the process followed for elementarizing the particles, and especially 
in specifying their procedures of observability. The modifications to the notions of simplicity and 
observability have been precipitated as a result of our further understanding of the complex role 
of symmetries. They are not merely a convenient means for constructing theories, they also seem 
to be continually modifying the conceptual framework within which a series of philosophical and 
methodological issues of elementary particle physics are discussed. 
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